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HOSPITAL CONVERSION REVENUE: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF PRESENT LAW AND FUTURE
PROPOSALS TO REFORM THE MANNER IN WHICH




America is experiencing the largest transformation of charitable assets
in its history.' This transformation is a result of conversions of health
care entities from not-for-profit (NFP) to for-profit (FP) status. As of
September 1997, these conversions generated approximately $9.3 billion
in revenue
There are two broad divisions of conversions; those involving NFP
and public hospitals, and those involving NFP health plans (including
managed care plans and Blue Cross/Blue Shield health insurance plans).
This Article focuses on the use of revenue generated through conversion
of NFP hospitals to FP status. Part I of the Article outlines the concept
of conversiton, explaining its mechanics and detailing concerns over the
historical uses of conversion revenue. Part II surveys legislation pres-
ently covering the use of conversion revenue, and discusses three pro-
posals for the future regulation of the use of conversion revenue. Part I
critically evaluates the three proposals, while Part IV finally presents a
model statute which attempts to build on the best of the three proposals
* J.D. candidate, Georgetown University Law Center, 1999; B.B.A.,
Newbold College (Bindsfield England), 1988; M.B.A., The University of Virginia,
1991. Mr. Standish worked for five years as an administrator of health care not-
for-profits prior to entering law school. The author would like to thank Robert Falk
for his invaluable guidance, and John Pomeranz of the Harrison Institute for Public
Law, for the time and expertise he devoted to assisting the author in understanding
the issues surrounding hospital conversions.
1. See David Shactman & Andrea Fishman, State Regulation of Health
Industry Conversions from Not-for-Profit to For-Profit Status 1 (Dec. 30, 1996)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
2. See id.
3. See STEPHEN L. ISAACS ET AL., HEALTH CARE CONVERSION
FOuNDATIOnS: 1997 STATUS REPORT 1 (1997).
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and present legislation.
I. THE CONVERSION PROCESS
A. An Introduction to Conversion
To understand the conversion process, it is necessary to understand
the difference between a FP hospital and a NFP hospital. The primary
differences between the two hospital organizational structures are the
ownership structure and the hospital's principle mission. NFP hospitals
are formed under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code which
requires that no part of a NFP hospital's net earnings may inure to the
benefit of any private shareholder or individual. 4 In contrast, FP hospi-
tals are free to have stock holders who are privately enriched by the per-
formance of the hospital. The second important distinction is that the
Internal Revenue Code requires 501(c)(3) hospitals to be operated ex-
clusively for charitable purposes.5 While FP hospitals and NFP hospitals
may appear to have the similar mission of providing high quality health
care to the community, FP hospitals have an additional mission to earn a
return for their stockholders.6
While there is no standard definition of conversion,7 a workable defi-
4. See Allen D. Hahn & Bryan A. Costantino, Hospital Valuation in Not-
For-Profit Conversion Transactions, INTRINSIC VALUE, Autumn 1997, at 1.
5. See id.
6. It is debatable whether this mission negatively impacts either the af-
fordability or quality of the health care provided at FP hospitals. This is particu-
larly true when the health care professionals who staff the hospitals own a large
percentage of the equity. In this case, the pressure to earn a return on investment,
and thus to boost stockholders' earnings, is not so dissimilar from the pressure in
NFP hospitals to earn a profit and thereby reward health care professionals with
monetary bonuses. For more discussion on the differences between FP and NFP
hospitals, see David Shactman & Stuart H. Altman, The Conversion of Hospitals
from Not-for-Profit to For-Profit Status (Sept. 26, 1996) (unpublished manuscript
on file with author). See also Gary Claxton et al., Public Policy Issues in Nonprofit
Conversions: An Overview, 16 HEALTH AFF. 9, 15 (1997) (noting conflicting evi-
dence as to whether a hospital's FP or NFP status makes a difference in the amount
of charitable care provided by a hospital).
7. An example of the ambiguity of the definition of a conversion occurred
in the Blue Cross of California's plan to "restructure" its organization by transfer-
ring 90% of its assets to a FP subsidiary and keeping only 10% of the company's
assets in the NFP Blue Cross entity. Initially, the California Department of Corpo-
rations determined this transaction was not a conversion. After considerable lob-
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nition is that a conversion occurs when the assets and/or control of a
NFP hospital come under the control of a FP entity.8 There are five ways
to convert NFP assets to a FP entity.9 The first way is through an acqui-
sition,10 where a NFP hospital is simply purchased by a FP entity, usu-
ally a FP hospital system." The second method is a merger, in which the
nonprofit hospital merges or consolidates with a for-profit hospital.'
2
The third method is a joint venture, in which the nonprofit hospital
shares an iiaterest in a new venture with a for-profit entity. 3 The fourth
conversion measure is a lease, where a NFP hospital leases its facilities
to a FP entity.'4 The fifth and final conversion method, restructuring,
can be performed two ways. 15 Either there is a "drop-down conversion,"
occurring when a NFP hospital creates a FP subsidiary without a FP
partner, 6 cr there is a conversion "in place," occurring when a NFP
hospital converts to a FP hospital without a FP partner.
1 7
During the mid-1990s, the number of hospital conversions per year
increased dramatically.' 8 There are a variety of factors which may ex-
plain the increase. These factors include a desire of NFP hospitals to
become part of a larger system, thereby achieving economies of scale in
purchasing and administration, a desire to exercise negotiation power
bying by Consumers Union, however, the Department reversed its decision, finding
that this transfer of assets from a NFP entity to the new FP subsidiary was, indeed,
a conversion. See Eleanor Hamburger et al., The Pot of Gold: Monitoring Health
Care Conversions Can Yield Billions of Dollars for Health Care, 29
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 473,479-89 (1995).
8. See JOHN POMERANZ, COMMUNITIES AND HEALTH CARE CONVERSIONS
2 (1997); see also, infra, APPENDIX (containing a great variety of definitions of
conversions encased in legislation, going from the transfer of all, or substantially
all of the NFP's assets to a FP entity, to the transfer of only 10% of a NFP's assets
or control to a FP entity).









18. Between 1980 and 1993, the average number of conversions per year
was approximately 14. See id. at 3. This is compared to 1994 when there were 33
conversions, 1995 when there were 59 conversions, and 1996 when there were 62
conversions. See id
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over customers, and a desire to drive competitors out of the market.' 9 In
addition, some suggest that NFP hospitals perceive themselves as disad-
vantaged because FP hospitals have more options to raise funds.20 NFP
hospitals cannot go to the market and issue equity; they are limited to
bonds, a form of capital acquisition that has specific detriments in re-
gard to NFP entities. Not only was there a recent down-grading of NFP
hospital bonds, 21 but also there is often a limitation on the usage of
funds raised through bond issuances. 22 The difficulty in raising debt-for-
capital expenditures occurred at the same time as immense buoyancy in
the equity markets, which made it relatively easy for FP hospital corpo-
rations to raise funds to buy NFPs. The inability to raise capital particu-
larly affects teaching hospitals, a subset of NFP hospitals, because they
are forced to adapt to reductions in federal support for teaching hospitals
and reductions in third-party payments. 23 Though business considera-
tions are often the motivation behind conversion, consumer advocates
allege that many conversions take place simply to avoid regulation, and
to fatten the wallets of hospital executives.24
Some scholars point to an economic efficiency rationale for convert-
ing NFP hospitals.2s They note that conversions can take community
assets and re-deploy them for a higher usage.26 For example, the board
of a NFP hospital may decide that the best use for the value it can re-
ceive through a conversion process is to advance the cause for which the
19. See POMERANZ, supra note 8, at 5.
20. See Lawrence E. Singer, The Conversion Conundrum: The State and
Federal Response to Hospitals' Changes in Charitable Status, 23 AM. J. L. &
HEALTH 221,221 (1997).
21. See id. at 227. In response to increased competition in the medical mar-
ketplace and fear of possible large cuts in the Medicare and Medicaid programs,
both the Moody's and Standard and Poor's indexes have downgraded tax-exempt
financing resulting in a requirement for NFPs to pay higher interest rates on bonds
they issue. See id.
22. See id. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 limited the usage of tax-exempt
bond funding, including a $150 million cap on usage for non-hospital projects such
as building outpatient physician offices. See id at 226-27 (citing Tax Reform Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1012, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986)).
23. See generally M. Gregg Bloche, Corporate Takeover of Teaching Hos-
pitals, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1035, 1046-55 (1992).
24. See POMERANZ, supra note 8, at 6.
25. See Singer, supra note 20, at 230.
26. See id.
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entity was founded.2 In addition to economic efficiency rationales,
some hospitals simply find themselves in an increasingly tenuous finan-
cial situation, and therefore, view the infusion of financial resources
from a FP, along with the infusion of financial expertise, as necessary to
its survival in the changing health care market.
28
Conversions may be viewed as transactions which create a net in-
crease in charitable assets. An example of this win-win scenario is the
conversion of St. John's and St. Vincent's Hospitals in Cleveland. In
conversion documents, Columbia/HCA agreed it would continue to pro-
vide the seme level of charitable care that the hospitals traditionally
provided.29 In doing so, the community did not lose any charitable assets
as Columbia/HCA paid $47 million into a new, charitable foundation.
30
The foundation, is run by a board of eighteen individuals with diverse
expertise including physicians, social service experts, lawyers and aca-
demicians drawn from the community. It provides grants for health,
education and human services.3 1 Thus, as the result of a conversion, a
community facing the loss of two hospitals and the charitable care they
provided, benefited not only from the assurance that these charitable
services would continue, but also from a new source of charitable fi-
nance.
There are a number of important issues in relation to conversion. Such
issues include whether NFPs are valued accurately, and thus, whether
FPs are buying NFPs at below fair market value; whether management is
using conversions to personally enrich themselves; whether the quality
of health care available to the community after a conversion is adequate;
whether health care remains, after conversion, accessible to the spec-
trum of community members; and the proper utilization of revenues
from the conversion process.3 2 In response to these concerns, legislators
passed a variety of measures to curtail abuses and ensure a proper per-
formance of the conversion process that include considerations given to
the interests of the community.33 Other groups also thought it necessary
27. See id.
28. See Telephone Interview with Sister Catherine Lee, Director, The Sisters




32. See generally Shactman & Altman, supra note 6.
33. See Maria Rothouse, Providers: Nonprofit Conversions, HEALTH
POLICY TRAcKiNG SERV., Dec. 31, 1997, at 3-4.
1998]
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to take action to protect communities. In September 1997, the American
Hospital Association issued guidelines for its members to follow when
converting.34 In March of 1998, the National Association of Attorneys
General issued a proposed model act containing its recommendation for
the conversion process.35 Furthermore, the consumer activist groups
Community Catalyst and Consumers Union developed a model act to
36govern conversions.
The future rate of NFP hospital conversions is uncertain. In 1996,
NFP and public hospitals combined still outnumbered FP hospitals by a
ratio of over five-to-one. 7 While there may be a vast number of NFP
hospitals that have yet to convert, in 1997 Columbia/HCA announced
that it would downsize and exit some markets, thus it sidelined its highly
aggressive purchasing of NFP hospitals. 38 In addition, Coopers & Ly-
brand note that FP corporations may have proceeded at a slower acqui-
sition rate in 1997 due to an increase in the regulation of conversions by
states.39 Despite this apparent slow down, the reasons for the present
conversion activity will not likely dissipate in the near future, and there-
fore, conversions will likely remain an issue.
B. Conversion Mechanics
The first step in a conversion occurs when a NFP's board of directors
decides to convert.40 In many states, once the NFP board decides to con-
vert to FP status, it must apply to a state court for permission.4 ' The state
attorney general (AG) is an automatic party to these proceedings as the
representative of the public interest.42 In the past, this representation was
often minimal, with the AG often lacking the experience or the re-
34. See AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES & GUIDELINES FOR
CHANGES IN HOSPITAL OWNERSHIP: KEEPING THE PUBLIC'S TRUST (1997).
35. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, PROPOSED
MODEL ACT FOR NONPROFIT HEALTHCARE CONVERSION TRANSACTIONS (1998).
36. See COMMUNITY CATALYST/CONSUMER'S UNION, A MODEL ACT
(1997).
37. See POMERANZ, supra note 8, at 9.
38. Hahn & Costantino, supra note 4, at 4.
39. See id.
40. See Judith Bell et al., The Preservation of Charitable Health Care As-
sets, 16 HEALTH AFF. 125, 126 (1997).
41. See Rothouse, supra note 33, at 2.
42. See id.
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sources to adequately supervise such transactions.
43
Conversions fall primarily under the ambit of state law. States use
three legal doctrines to determine the use of conversion revenue. The
first is the charitable trust doctrine, which requires that the assets of a
charitable nonprofit entity must always be dedicated to the charitable
purposes for which it was established. 45 A corporation creates a charita-
ble trust by identifying some sort of charitable purpose in its articles of
incorporation. 46 The charitable restrictions in the trust's articles of in-
corporation apply even when the corporation converts or dissolves.47
When the original purpose of a trust can no longer be carried out, most
states invoke the cy pres doctrine, 48 allowing a court to determine an-
other use for the assets of the trust. Usually, this purpose is as similar as
possible to the original purpose.49 At cy pres proceedings in state court,
the AG often represents the public interest, although some states give
this role to, the state charities division. 50 The third doctrine applied is
parens patria,5 1 which is a common law doctrine that vests power in the
state to protect assets pledged for public use.52 Through the application
of these dootrines, the money paid by the FP entity for the NFP entity's
assets or control generally transfers into a new NFP foundation, to an
43. See Eric S. Tower, Director's Duty to Obtain a Fair Price in the Con-
version of Nonprofit Hospitals, 6 ANN. HEALTH L. 157, 165 (1997).
44. See ISAACS ET AL., supra note 3, at 18. Of course, conversions can also
trigger federal law with respect to anti-trust and taxation matters. See id
45. Shactman & Altman, supra note 6, at 41.
46. See Hamburger et al., supra note 7, at 489.
47. Sea id.
48. Cy pres is short for the Norman French phrase cy pres comme possible
which means "as near as possible." It is pronounced "see pray." See POMERANZ,
supra note 8, at 21. For a history of the development of the cy pres doctrine, see
Vanessa Laird, Phantom Selves: The Search for a General Charitable Intent in the
Application cf the Cy Pres Doctrine, 40 STAN. L. REV. 973, 974-77 (1988). Most
states have adopted the American Bar Association's Model Nonprofit Corporation
Act, which contains a statutory cy pres provision. They have also adopted the
AMA model that requires cy pres when there is a court ordered or supervised sale
of substantially all of a NFP entity's assets. See POMERANZ, supra note 8, at 22.
49. See Hamburger et al., supra note 7, at 489.
50. See Shactman & Altman, supra note 6, at41.
51. Literally, "parent of the country," the phrase refers traditionally to the
role of state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
52. See id.
1998]
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existing NFPs, or to the government.
53
Historically, the application of common law doctrines to determine
the use of conversion revenue resulted in two procedural inadequacies.
First, boards often structured deals which undervalued a NFP's assets at
the time of the conversion, but gave the assets equity in the new FP en-
tity.54 This limited the amount of the assets treated in the cy pres pro-
ceeding.5" Second, without adequate controls on the future use of the
revenue, there was unequal application of the doctrines. In more recent
times, some states have enacted legislation aimed at remedying past
failures of the common law process.
C. Concerns With the Historical Approach to Conversions
The history of conversions is littered with deals in which conversion
revenue was misused or had questionable purposes. The problems that
developed in the use of conversion revenue may be divided into two
categories. First, there are prevalent conflict of interest problems, in-
cluding the under-evaluation of NFP assets, circular grant making and
questionable foundation staffing. Second, questions often arise over the
appropriateness of funding certain activities with conversion revenue.
Because there is no consensus as to precisely what are appropriate uses,
this second area is very controversial.
1. Potential Conflicts of Interest
The first problem experienced with revenue from conversions was the
actual lack of revenue. In a number of well documented cases, conver-
sions occurred in which the value of the assets was dramatically under-
valued by the NFP's board. Some conversions in California in the early
1980s were structured so that no assets of the converted NFP entity were
set aside for future charitable purposes. 56 There are also numerous cases
in which the revenue set aside for continued charitable operations ap-
pears to have been a fraction of the value of the assets converted. Four
HMO conversions in the mid-1980s serve to demonstrate this problem.
At the time of conversion in 1984, the Family Health Plan was sold for
$38.5 million by its board, two years later the value of its stock was
53. See GAO, NOT-FOR-PROFIT HOSPITALS: CONVERSION ISSUES PROMPT
INCREASED STATE OVERSIGHT 18 (1997).
54. See Hamburger et al., supra note 7, at 476-79.
55. See id.
56. See Shactman & Altman, supra note 6, at 39.
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$136.6 million.57 The value of Foundation Health in 1984 was $78 mil-
lion; a year later the value of its stock was $302.5 million.58 The value
of Pacificare Health was $360,000 at the time of conversion, but only a
year later its value was $45.3 million.59 Finally, the value of Inland
Health Care at its conversion in 1985 was $663,000, a year later its
valuation increased fifty-six times to $37.5 million.60 Some of the deals
that lead to such dramatic and obvious under-valuation at the time of
conversion, also resulted in enormous windfalls for the NFP board
members.! ' A good example of how this worked is the conversion of
Health Net, a nonprofit HMO. 62 The conversion deal allowed thirty-
three Health Net executives to buy twenty percent of the stock in the
new FP corporation for $1.5 million.63 Four years later, those shares
were worth approximately $315 million.
64
The under-valuation of the assets of NFP entities resulted in millions
of dollars enriching private parties, rather than going through the cypres
process wihere the assets would be directed toward future charitable ac-
tivities. The problems created by conflicts of interest did not end with
the under-valuation of NFP assets. There were also problems with the
use of assets that were subject to cy pres. Generally, the application of
the cy pres doctrine results in the creation of a new NFP foundation
which receives the value of the assets of the converted entity. The re-
sponsibility of this foundation is to use the revenue for purposes as close
as possible to the mission of the converted entity. But there was much
wiggle room under many state applications of cy pres that allowed for
the misuse or at least sub-optimal use of the funds.
65
Circular grant making is the most obvious misuse of funds due to con-
flicts of interest among members of foundation boards. It occurs when a
new foundation uses its authority to grant funds to the new FP entity.
66








65. Conversion revenue has been used for everything from public parks,
school improvements, cultural events and simply absorbed into state budgets to pay
for deficits. See id at 231.
66. See Hamburger et al., supra note 7, at 486.
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A good example of circular grant making was attempted after the con-
version of Blue Cross of California.67 One of the largest initiatives pro-
posed by the new foundation created.by the conversion was a $15 mil-
lion grant to CaliforniaKids, a subsidiary of Blue Cross.68 In addition,
other projects identified for funding by the foundation were university
programs which focused on issues of relevance to the HMO industry.69
The Consumers Union identified these grants as using the funds from
the conversion to subsidize research and development for the HMO in-
dustry.
70
Considering the management of some of the new foundations, it
should come as no surprise that the circular grant making was approved.
There are numerous instances in which the new foundation's board was
comprised of employees or board members of the new FP entity or the
old NFP entity.71 A Grantmakers in Health 72 survey of forty foundations
that were created from conversions discovered that ninety-seven percent
selected boards which had a majority of members from the former health
care institution.73
The problem with boards consisting of employees of the former NFP
are numerous. First, individual board members often own stock in the
new FP. Second, the board members of the new foundation often are
instrumental in the conversion of the old NFP entity, and therefore, have
the type of close relationship with the new FP entity that can easily re-
sult in circular grant making. Third, deals which promise the opportunity
of new positions to NFP executives in foundations that were formed to
receive the conversion revenue create a conflict of interest for those ex-
ecutives when they negotiate to convert. If executives have a job guar-
anteed for them in the new foundation, at wages that may exceed their
present salary, and with pressures that would likely be significantly less
than those of health care administrators, the personal impetus to make a
deal becomes obvious. Finally, foundation funds were used to pay gen-





71. The issue of control of new foundations by staff of the FP entity was
bitterly contested by the Consumers Union. See id. at 486, 488-89.
72. A non-profit, health care advisory firm located in Washington, D.C.
73. See Nancy M. Kane, Some Guidelines for Managing Charitable Assets
from Conversions, 16 HEALTH AFF. 229, 234 (1997).
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through any competitive hiring process based on ability and
C.74
experience,.
2. Determining Appropriate Uses for Conversion Revenue
The second major question arising with the use of conversion revenue
is whether the use of conversion revenue deposited in foundations is
appropriate. Comprehensive reports on the use of conversion revenue
indicate that in approximately half of the cases in which conversions
resulted in the transfer of conversion revenue to a foundation, the funds
were used exclusively to make grants to advance community health care
in one form or another." In addition to health care, these foundations
provided grants for a variety of community uses, including education
and cultural projects. 6
Foundation grants that do not go to health-related purposes tend to be
the most controversial. Objections to these grants may be divided into
three categories: 1) objections tolfrivolous use, 2) objections to elitist
uses, and ;) objections to non-health related purposes. The best example
of a frivolous grant is for the building of a scale model of the space
shuttle that belches smoke for the use of fifth graders." Elitist use of
conversion revenue included grants for the arts and humanities.78 How-
ever, there is no common paradigm for the appropriate use of conversion
funds. As a result, individuals and groups with differing philosophical
and political beliefs may perceive a problem with the use of foundation
revenue for non-health care related activities. While some foundations
restrict their grants to the provision of acute health care, others include
preventative care, and still others encompass secondary projects that
74. An example of this problem occurred in the conversion of Horizon
Medical Center. During this conversion the son of one of Horizon's founders was
hired as director of the new foundation. In this position, the son made $209,684
per annum. Such hiring decisions raise questions as to the appropriateness of the
use of charilable funds to-pay for insiders' generous salaries. See Greg Jaffe &
Monica Langley, Generous to a Fault? Fledgling Charities Get Billions from
Sales of Nonprofit Hospitals, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 1996, at Al.
75. Grants for health care are broadly defined, and include everything from
violence prevention, medical education, prevention, and elderly care. See ISAACS
ET AL., supra note 3, at 19-24.
76. See id.
77. See Jaffe & Langley, supra note 74,.at Al.
78. See ISAACS ET AL., supra note 3, at 19-24.
1998]
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may increase health care indirectly.7 9 Finally, there is a class of founda-
tions that use conversion revenues for grants that are unrelated to health
care at all. Examples of these types of grants are: promotion of culture,
community historical preservation, financial assistance to particular re-
ligious bodies and ethnic cultural preservation and promotion. 0 While
all of these uses may be beneficial in one way or another, they beg the
question as to whether such loose controls on the use of conversion
revenue results in the dispersion of revenues for sub-optimal use, and
whether this variety of funding projects can be justified when the source
of the revenue is considered.
With these problems, it may be reasonable to ask why consumer
groups did not sue to protect the conversion revenue. The answer is sim-
ple. In most states, and in most situations, consumer groups did not have
standing.8' Standing was limited to the AG's office, which often lacked
the background or the resources to adequately pursue these issues.82 In
some instances, politics was another reason why an AG's protection of
public assets was minimal.8 3 Many state AGs are elected, and the AG's
post is usually a stepping stone to a higher state office." With the
amount of money needed in politics to run effective campaigns, and the
financial resources of the FP health care sector, it would appear likely
that such considerations may have lead to some AGs handling conver-
sions with kid gloves.
79. As an example of the latter, some foundations may initiate efforts to
reduce poverty.
80. See id.
81. See Linda B. Miller, The Conversion Game: High Stakes, Few Rules, 16
HEALTHAFF. 112, 115 (1997).
82. See Donald Shriber, State Experience in Regulating a Changing Health
Care System, 16 HEALTH AFF. 48, 58 (1997).
83. Politics were exacerbated when a number of public officials had over-
lapping jurisdiction over conversions. For example the insurance commissioner
and the attorney general may both be elected officials with different agendas. Con-
versions in a number of states have become hot political issues. See id at 59-61.
84. A good example is Virginia's Attorney General, Jim Gilmore, who was
elected governor in 1997.
Hospital Conversion Revenue
II. THE PRESENT STATE OF DEALING WITH CONVERSION
REVENUE
A. Current Legislation Covering Conversion Revenue
Many states and the federal government are in the process of re-
sponding to the issues raised due to conversion activity. Much of the
response is through enhanced regulation. It is important to recognize
that statutes aimed directly at conversions are only part of the picture.
One must also consider state corporate codes regulating sales and Inter-
nal Revenue Service regulations.85 As of February 1998, twenty-five
states and the District of Columbia have enacted legislation directly
concerning conversions. 86 The pace of legislation concerning conver-
sions is telling. In 1990, one statute was enacted, in 1995, two statutes
were enacted, in 1996, eleven statutes were enacted, and in 1997, thirty-
four laws and one resolution were enacted. 87 Despite the legislative ef-
forts, however, conversion revenues remain unprotected from the prob-
lems stemming from conflicts of interest and the ambiguity of appropri-
ate use of revenue even in the majority of states with conversion legali-
zation. Enacted legislation is far from uniform, and in no case does a
statute address the full range of issues involved in conversion revenue,
although some statutes come close.
88
Statutes that deal with the issues of conversion revenue may be di-
vided into three categories: 1) statutes that address the valuation of the
converting: NFP to ensure the payment of a fair value and, therefore, the
preservation of the charitable assets in the form of conversion revenue,
2) statutes that define the permitted uses of conversion revenue, and 3)
statutes that mandate specific governance structures for the entities that
receive the conversion revenue. The first step, however, of statutory
application to conversion revenue is determining the breadth of the
85. State law imposes fiduciary duties of care, loyalty and good faith on
NFP directors. In addition, the IRS issued a 1996 document outlining the factors
they will consider in monitoring the sales of NFP hospitals. These factors include
whether the fair market value was paid for the NFP's assets, whether the assets will
be used to support indigent and Medicaid services, whether any direct or indirect
payment is offered to induce the sale. See Tower, supra note 43, at 165, 179-80.
86. See HARRISON INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC LAW, STATE-BY-STATE HEALTH-
CARE CONW-RSION LEGISLATION 2-3 (1998).
87. See Rothouse, supra note 33, at 22.
88. See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 32-552 to 554 (1997).
1998]
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transactions covered.
As previously noted, there is no uniform definition of what constitutes
a conversion. This is reflected in the statutes. Not all conversion statues
define precisely what types of transactions they cover, but those that do
vary widely. The narrowest statutory coverage is for transactions that
result in "all or substantially all of the assets transferred from a NFP to a
FP entity." 89 Under such a restrictive definition, even the most thorough
regulatory scheme will have only a limited impact on conversions be-
cause a wide variety of transactions remain outside the statutory defini-
tion. This is particularly true as more complex arrangements between
NFP hospitals and FP entities develop. 90 Clearly, any entity wishing to
avoid legislative restrictions must simply structure the deal appropri-
ately.
Existing statutes dealing with conversion revenue can be categorized
according to the transactional amount necessary to trigger their provi-
sions. First, there are statutes that cover transactions that result in a sub-
stantial amount of assets transferred from a FP to a NFP. Second, there
are statutes that cover a material amount of assets transferred from a FP
to a NFP. Finally, there are statutes that define a threshold percentage
change in ownership or control from FP to NFP statutes. Of the last
category, the percentage necessary for the statute to become effective
ranges from a ten percent transfer in assets or control, up to a fifty per-
cent change in assets or control.9' The lower the percentage transfer re-
quired for coverage, the more transactions will be covered.
A further subtlety is incorporated in the Vermont conversion statute.92
This statute mandates that not only are all transactions that result in a
ten percent change transfer of assets or control covered by the statute,
but that the ten percent threshold can be met through one or more trans-
actions.93 The purpose of this language is to prevent a series of transac-
tions designed to fall below the threshold, but nonetheless have a cu-
89. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-2591 to 2594 (West 1997); VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-531 (Michie 1997).
90. These more complex arrangements include leases, management con-
tracts, and joint ventures.
91. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4512 (1997) (requiring a 10% or more
transfer in assets or control before the statute applies to a transaction); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 31-7-400 to 412 (Supp. 1998) (requiring at least a 50% transfer of assets
or control before the statute applies to a transaction).
92. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4512.
93. Id. §§ 4512, 4523, 4581, 4595.
Hospital Conversion Revenue
mulative effect of transferring a percentage of control that is higher than
the threshOld.
To protect conversion revenue, the first step is to ensure a fair value is
paid for the NFP. There are six measures conversion legislation has in-
cluded in an effort to ensure this goal. These measures are: 1) a broad
mandate that a FP pays fair market value for a NFP's assets,94 2) a broad
mandate that a FP pays market value for any management contract en-
tered into by a NFP,95 3) a requirement that the performance of transfers
of assets occurs only after due diligence by the NFP's board,96 4) a pro-
hibition against private inurement from conversions and/or a require-
ment that all conflicts of interest be disclosed,97 5) a required method(s)
to employ in valuing NFPs in conversion transactions,9" and 6) a re-
quirement of valuation by an independent body.99
The final area of conversion legislation impacting the use of conver-
sion reverLue is provisions that relate to the governance of entities that
receive conversion revenue. This area is key, as many of the past prob-
lems with conversion revenue stem from foundations which were man-
aged by boards with conflicts of interest.'0° There are currently seven
types of provisions enacted by the states to ensure appropriate govern-
ance of foundations. The governance provisions are: 1) the structure of
the entity is mandated by statute;1°  2) the foundation must be independ-
94. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1399.70-1399.75 (West
1998).
95. See, e.g., 1997 CONN. ACTS 188 (Reg. Sess.).
96. &ee, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 71-20,103 to 108 (Michie 1996).
97. &ee, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7:19-b (1997).
98. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-16-324 (1997).
The commissioner shall determine the fair market value of the
corporation at the time of conversion, determined as if it had vot-
ing stock outstanding and one hundred percent of its stock were
freeiy transferable and available for purchase without restrictions.
Consideration shall be given to market value, investment or earn-
ings value, net asset value and a control premium, if any. If a
qualifying entity or entities receive, at the time of conversion, one
hundred percent of the shares of the then-outstanding stock of the
corporation, the qualifing entity or entities shall be regarded as
having acquired the fair market value of the corporation, unless
the commissioner finds that such outstanding stock does not repre-
sent the fair market value of the corporation.Id
99. See, e.g., OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 109.34 to .35 (Anderson 1997).
100. See, e.g., Hamburger et al., supra note 7 (noting how many managers
often take advantage of inattentive regulators).
101. That is, through reference to § 501(c)(3) and/or § 501(c)(4) corpora-
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ent from the FP acquirer; 10 2 3) the foundation must be independent from
the converting NFP;10 3 4) the foundation must demonstrate that its di-
rectors and officers are competent for their jobs; 0 4 5) the foundation
must have procedures in place to ensure there are no conflicts of inter-
est;10 5 6) the foundation must have board representation from the com-
munity; 1 6 and 7) the foundation must make an annual report to a state
government official which details to whom grants were made, the
amount of the grants and the purpose of the grants. 0 7 Though these
remedies are available, currently only nine states have enacted legisla-
tion mandating any form of government governance procedure. 03 Fur-
ther, only California, Maine, and Rhode Island have enacted more than
three out of the seven governance provisions listed above.
0 9
Another question to be answered is what corporate structure should
receiving entities adopt. There are two statutory possibilities, either a
section 501 (c)(3) corporate status or a section 501 (c)(4) corporate status.
The former is the typical structure for NFP hospitals and charities, and
the latter is the typical structure for lobbying groups, such as the Na-
tional Rifle Association." 0 Section 501(c)(3) corporations must follow
special reporting, grant making and accountability requirements which
501(c)(4) corporations do not."' In addition, 501(c)(3) corporations may
not lobby, make campaign contributions or directly benefit their manag-
ers or directors in any way other than salaries.' 2 On the other hand,
501(c)(4) corporations are free to lobby, make campaign contributions
and engage in activities that directly benefit their managers or directors.
Furthermore, they are not required to make any grants for charitable
tions. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-16-324.
102. See, e.g., id.
103. See, e.g., id.
104. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-17.14-1 to .14-33.
105. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 194(A).
106. See, e.g., id.
107. See, e.g., id.
108. See APPENDiX, infra. The states are Arizona, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Maine, Rhode Island, and Washington.
109. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1399.70 to .75; ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 194(A) (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-17.14-1 to .14-33
(1997).
110. See Hamburger et al., supra note 7, at 486.
111. See id.
112. See id. (citing I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)).
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activities, incoming donations are not tax deductible, and reporting re-
quirements are significantly less restrictive than for a 501(c)(3) corpo-
ration." 3 For this reason, of the four states that explicitly permit in their
conversion statutes for conversion funds to be paid into 501(c)(4) enti-
ties,' 14 all but one proscribe limits on the political activities that may be
pursued by entities receiving conversion revenues." s
The most far reaching proposals concerning the governance of entities
controllin!g conversion revenue was proposed in Maryland. The bill
mandates that sixty percent of conversion revenue go into a single state-
wide foundation,"16 whose board would be appointed by state officials.'
7
The remaining forty percent goes to a community-based foundation." 8
There are eight statutory provisions that deal directly with the per-
mitted uses of conversion revenues. As previously indicated, while there
appears to be broad support for legislation dealing with conflicts of in-
terest, including the above measures dealing with fair value and the sub-
sequent measures, explained below, dealing with the governance of con-
version foundations, there is no such agreement on the precise use of the
revenue. Due to this vague situation, the legislation tends to be some-
what amb:iguous in this area. The eight measures are: 1) revenues can be
used only for the purposes set forth in the converting NFP's articles of
incorporaion;" 9 2) revenues generated from the sale of assets which
were purchased with restricted donor grants can only be used for the
purposes set forth in those donor's grants; 120 3) revenues can be used for
113. See id.; see also Kane, supra note 73, at 230-31.
114. The states allowing payment of conversion finds into section
501(c)(4) entities are California, Colorado, Maine, and Ohio. See, infra APPENDIX.
115. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1399.70 to .75; COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 10-16-324; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 194(A); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 10 9.34 to .35.
116. The state-wide foundation was created by statute in 1997.
There is a nonprofit Maryland Health Care Foundation established
to promote public awareness of the need to provide more timely
and cost-effective care for Marylanders without health insurance
and to receive moneys that can be used to provide financial sup-
pori: to programs that expand access to health care services or
uninsured Marylanders.
MD. COD" ANN. HEALTH-GEN. II §§ 20-502-510 (Supp. 1997).
117. See MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN. II § 20-504 (Supp. 1997).
118. See H.B. 167, 412th Sess. (Md. 1998) (enacted).
119. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.45.020, .070 (1997).
120. See, e.g., 1997 CONN. ACTS 188 (Reg. Sess.).
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a broad range of charitable purposes;' 2 1 4) revenues can be used for
broad health related purposes; 22 5) revenues are restricted to use for
acute health care; 23 6) there are limitations on the use of conversion
revenue for political activities; 24 7) revenues must be used within a spe-
cific geographic area; 125 and 8) revenues are forbidden to be used to
benefit the FP involved in the conversion.
126
While none of the states have passed legislation requiring revenue be
used exclusively for acute medical care, at least one attorney general,
Daniel Lungren of California, is advocating this view. In a letter dated
March 27, 1997, Mr. Lungren opposed the passage of S.B. 848 princi-
pally because it would allow a NFP "to completely disregard the chari-
table trust under which those assets were held. Instead the entity could
use the assets for just about any community priority it wants... we be-
lieve this is bad policy ... ,,127 Mr. Lungren's opposition to legislatively
allowing the use of conversion revenue for a wide range of community
benefit activities is that in so doing, the legislature permits the use of
funds for purposes that may lack the charitable trust obligation under
which they were donated and/or held. 128 A broad community purpose
test for the use of conversion revenues would make such projects as
"equestrian centers, skating rinks and anything else deemed to be a
'community priority"' legitimate funding recipients. 129 In addition, by
legislating such a broad range of permissible uses for conversion reve-
nue, California would be overturning common law.
30
121. See, e.g., ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-2591 to 2594.
122. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1399.70 to .75.
123. Acute health care includes outpatient physician care and inpatient
hospital care, but does not include wellness programs, health education or any other
similar type of efforts to improve health through a non-direct health care service
provision. Presently, no legislation restricts the use of conversion revenue exclu-
sively to acute health care.
124. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH& SAFETY CODE §§ 1399.70 to .75.
125. See, e.g., 1997 CONN. ACTS 188.
126. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 32-552 to 554.
127. Letter from Peter K. Shack, Deputy Attorney General, State of Cali-
fornia, to Kenneth L. Maddy, California State Senator 1-2 (Mar. 27, 1997) (on file
with author).
128. See id. at 3.
129. Id
130. See Queen of Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 136 Cal. Rptr. 36, 39 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1997).
The rules governing the use of the assets of a nonprofit charitable
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Congressman Pete Stark (D-Ca.) has proposed legislation at the Fed-
eral level that would deny Medicare participation to any converting en-
tity that did not follow the rules set forth.131 The bill requires the use of
conversion revenue only for purposes consistent with the converting
entity's charter and the promotion of health in the affected
community.132 One of the primary purposes for Stark's proposed bill is
to ensure the strict use of conversion revenue for the delivery of health
care. 133 He stated that "it is unacceptable that the money from some of
the conveiting hospitals went to a foundation that has nothing to do with
providing health care."
134
Consumers Union, an organization that brings the issues related to
conversions to public attention, also insists on the use of conversion
revenue for health care. However, it believes that funds should be used
for a broader range of activities related to health care than merely acute
health care.
135
At present, there is a significant flurry of legislation. It is debatable
whether this legislation will be effective in ensuring that conflicts are
averted. Irt addition, most of the legislation is too broad to settle the de-
organization are well established: 'All the assets of the corporation
organized solely for charitable purposes must be deemed to be im-
pressed with a charitable trust by virtue of the express declaration
of the corporation's purposes, and not-withstandiig the absence of
any express declaration by those who contribute such assets as to
the purpose for which the contributions are made .... It follows
that.... [a nonprofit corporation cannot] legally divert its assets to
any other than charitable purposes, and said properties [are] there-
fore 'irrevocably dedicated' to exempt purposes within the mean-
ing -of the welfare exemption.' [Tihe issue is not, as plaintiffs
contend, whether the operation of clinics serving the poor in the
areas in which they live is as worthy a use of charitable funds. We
can assume that such operation would be a desirable purpose for a
nonprofit corporation. This corporation is, however, found by its
articles of incorporation. Queen may maintain a hospital ant re-
tain control over its assets or it may abandon the operation of a
hospital and lose those assets to the successor distributees ... but
it cannot do both.
Id.
131. See Medicare Nonprofit Hospital Protection Act of 1997, H.R. 44,
105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
132. See id.
133. See Bureau of National Affairs, Reps. Stark Coyne Say GAO Report
Supports Oversight of Hospital Transactions, HEALTH L. RPTR., Jan. 8, 1998, at 10.
134. See id.
135. See Letter from Christine Tien, Projects Manager, West Coast Re-
gional Office of Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., to James R. Schwartz, Deputy
Attorney General, State of California (Jan. 6, 1998) (on file with author).
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bate over what the precise use of conversion revenue should be. Litiga-
tion remains an ineffective tool for the private enforcement of protection
of revenues generated through NFP hospital conversions, because
standing is not legislatively extended, and such an extension appears to
be unlikely.
B. Current Proposals for the Future of Conversion Revenue
There are three documents which have been produced by major play-
ers in the conversion arena with the purpose of influencing the future of
conversions: 1) a document crafted by the American Hospital Associa-
tion for its members,136 2) a model act proposed by the National Asso-
ciation of Attorneys General, 137 and 3) a model act developed by The
Community Catalyst and Consumers Union. 38 While all three docu-
ments address the issue of appropriate uses of conversion revenue, all
fall short of a comprehensive solution.
The first aspect of the American Hospital Association's document is
that it is not binding on its members. 39 The document's effectiveness
under such circumstances is questionable. Nevertheless, it contains a
number of good suggestions. It notes that boards of hospitals have a fi-
duciary duty to the communities they serve and, therefore, should make
all decisions in light of this duty. 40 In addition, the document notes that
boards have a duty to disclose and/or avoid any conflicts of interest.14
Furthermore, the board must protect the value of the NFP's assets, as
well as embrace the task of ensuring that the assets continue to improve
the health of the community.
42
The National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) Proposed
Model Act is comprehensive and appears to have been influenced by the
Community Catalyst/Consumers Union Model Act which preceded it by
approximately a year. 143 The distinguishing feature of this Act is the
136. See AMERICAN HOSPITAL AssOcIATION, supra note 34.
137. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note
35.
138. See id.
139. See AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 34, at 3, 7.
140. See id. at 5.
141. See id
142. See id at 6.
143. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 35, at
§§ 1-9.
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continued emphasis of the role of the AG in the conversion process. The
emphasis iis reflected in provisions which provide an AG with the dis-
cretion to grant a written waiver to converting NFPs so that they are not
subject to its stipulations. 44 In addition, the Act provides a number of
factors for AGs to consider, but ultimately allows them discretion re-
garding whether or not to consider these factors and what weight to give
them. 45 Thus, despite its rather strict language, the potential problem of
political influence on the attorney general remains a very real concern
under this act.
The Community Catalyst/Consumers Union Model Act is the most
comprehensive proposal for future conversion activity. It is particu!arly
good at identifying potential conflicts and proposing measures that ad-
dress them. For example, the Model Act has three provisions dealing
with the governance of foundations. These include a requirement of total
independence from the FP buyer, internal mechanisms to avoid con-
flicts, and a requirement of annual reporting of foundation activities.
46
The Appendix to this article provides a comprehensive comparison
between the areas of the proposed acts that deal with conversion revenue
and legislation already passed. None of the proposals, however, add any
novel measure. This may be due to the influence of the Community
Catalyst/Consumer's Union Model Act which received wide circulation
during the period of intense legislation on the issue.
III. EVALUATING THE PROPOSALS
A. Scope of Legislation
The first question when approaching conversion legislation is the
breadth of the transactions that the legislation covers. None of the three
144. See id. at § 2.03.
145. See id. at §§ 5.01-5.02. An example is section five of the Proposed
Model Act which is entitled "Discretion of Attorney General; Review Elements,"
which contins the elements to consider in deciding whether to approve or disap-
prove any given conversion. See id. Elements for the attorney general's discretion,
and therefore open to industry influence, are whether there has been a breach of
fiduciary duty, whether the assets will be used in accordance with the trust in which
they were held by the NFP and whether the fair market value was paid for the as-
sets or control. See id. at §§ 5.01(1), (3), (4). In other words, the attorney general
could use her discretion to ignore all of these factors and still comply with this act.
See id. at § § 3(8), (9), (11), 6.
146. See COMMUNITY CATALYST/CONSUMERS UNION, supra note 36.
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proposals outlined in the previous section provides a specific definition
of the type of transaction that is covered. The Community Cata-
lyst/Consumers Union and the NAAG model acts, for example, both
cover only transactions in which a "material amount" of assets is in-
volved. 47 This vague language leaves the acts open to wide discretion
on the part of the enforcing party. It also provides no clear guidelines to
hospitals as they consider transactions. Vagueness is, in part, the very
problem for which the proposals were drafted. A clearer definition is
necessary if enforcers are to be held to a consistent standard unswayed
by political pressure and if NFPs are to be able to plan transactions effi-
ciently.
Alternatives to the "material amount" standard range from transac-
tions which result in the transfer of as little as ten percent of a NFP's
assets or control, 148 to transactions which result in the transfer of "all or
substantially all" of its assets or control. 49 It is questionable whether
provisions that cover transactions that transfer as little as ten percent of
a NFP's assets or control are efficient. 50 If the goal of legislation regu-
lating conversions is to preserve charitable assets, which should be the
overarching goal, such legislation must operate in the realm of reality.
Triggering a major regulatory process every time a NFP distributes ten
percent of its assets into the open market, results in tying the hands of
NFPs by slowing the process and in some cases, therefore, making such
sales untenable. This is not consistent with the goal of preserving NFP
assets. In order to remain viable, NFPs need the flexibility to be able to
modify their operations, which may mean buying and selling portions of
their hospitals. Through such transactions, NFPs are able to sell off un-
profitable operations and to raise capital for the hospital. Without such
flexibility, FPs, who can buy and sell portions of their operations at will,
have yet another advantage over NFPs in the market.
On the other end of the scale are statutes that only apply to transac-
tions which involve "all or substantially all" of a NFP's assets.'51 This
definition exempts a wide variety of transactions and thus may not apply
to the vast majority of transactions that transfer NFP assets or control to
147. See id.; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra
note 35, at 1.
148. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4523.
149. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 55-531 (Michie Supp. 1997).
150. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4523.
151. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 55-531.
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FP entities:. Such language is an invitation for those who want to avoid.
legislation to structure the deal to fall below the high threshold (e.g.
purchase eighty percent of the assets, paying a premium for control).
Thus, such language renders statutes ineffective.
If ten percent is too low a threshold for legislation to apply, and "all
or substantially all" is too high a threshold, this begs the question of at
what point exactly should conversion legislation apply. While there is
no scientific manner in which to determine this point, thirty-five to forty
percent is a logical point. When thirty-five to forty percent of a NFP's
assets or control is transferred to a FP, the nature of the entity is funda-
mentally altered. It can no longer be said that a NFP is utilizing the mar-
ket to bolster its operations. Rather, it is at this point that the NFP loses
substantiall control of its own destiny and becomes a partner with the FP
interest.
It is also important to include language that covers the cumulative
effect of multiple transactions if any definition is to be effective. A good
way of addressing this issue is to simply note that the threshold transfer
can occur in any number of transactions within a given number of years.
Due to the rate of change in health care, both in the market and in insti-
tutional management, an exceedingly lengthy period does not appear
necessary. Thus a range of four to six years appears appropriate.
B. Ensuring a Payment of Fair Value
All three conversion proposals for the future contain provisions to
ensure a fair value is paid for NFPs.152 They all include prohibitions on
private inurement/disclosure of conflicts of interest, and two of the three
required independent valuations. 153 These prohibitions, however, do not
ensure the stated goal, which is a true market value for NFP assets or
control. An independent valuation is a fine proposition, but the issue of
valuation remains. Further, a NFP may have legitimate reasons for re-
fusing the top offer for its assets (e.g., when a lower bidder includes in
their bid & provision that will bind them to a higher percentage of ongo-
ing charity care than the higher bidder is willing to agree to). More fun-
damentally, the only true determinant of what an asset or control is'
152. See AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASsOcIATION, supra note 34, at 9;
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATfORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 35, § 5.01(3);
COMMUNITY CATALYST/CONSUMERS UNION, supra note 36, at 49.
153. See AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 34, at 9;
NATIONAL .ASSOCIATION OF ATrORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 35, § 5.01(3).
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worth, is what the market will pay for it. Therefore, any provision re-
quiring fair value that does not include a process to ensure the market
has the ability to bid through a fair, open and equitable process will not
achieve its stated aim. The "Alternate Model Statute" offers a process
for achieving true market value for NFP assets.
C. Regulating Foundation Governance
Only the Community Catalyst/Consumers Union proposal effectively
addresses the issue of foundation governance. 5 4 The proposal requires
that no director, officer or staff of the foundation may be affiliated with
the FP entity involved in the conversion or any of its affiliates. 155 From
past experience with circular grant making, it appears this provision is
necessary. The Community Catalyst/Consumers Union Model Act also
requires that no person who is a director, officer or staff of the convert-
ing NFP may serve on the new foundation during the conversion proc-
ess.156 As previously noted, a bill in Maryland proposes a broader provi-
sion which mandates that sixty percent of conversion revenue goes to a
foundation whose board is appointed by state officials.
157
These rules attempt to address particular problems involved with con-
versions. The problems addressed focus on the potential conflict of in-
terest that is created in board members of a NFP, when they have the
potential of personally benefiting from the conversion. While this is a
significant concern in stand-alone NFP hospitals such as community
hospitals, where the board members do not have direct accountability
outside the hospital, the ritk of this conflict is not inherent in all conver-
sions. In particular, when a NFP hospital is part of a broader NFP entity
such as a university or a religious body's hospital system, 159 the risk of
154. See COMMUNITY CATALYST/CONSUMERS UNION, supra note 36, at
47.
155. See id. The NAAG Proposed Model Act contains provisions which
state that the attorney general should consider whether conversion revenue will be
placed in a foundation which is "broadly based in the community and representa-
tive of the community." NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATrORNEYs GENERAL, supra
note 35, § 5.01(9). As previously noted, however, this is merely a point for consid-
eration, not a mandatory requirement. See id. at 1.
156. See COMMUNITY CATALYST/CONSUMERS UNION, supra note 36, at
49.
157. See H.B. 167, 412th Sess. (Md. 1998) (enacted).
158. See, e.g., WORKING POLICY: NORTH AMERICAN DIVISION OF THE
GENERAL CONFERENCE OF SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTISTS 90 (1997). Many of the 60
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board conflicts of interest is significantly diminished. The reason for
this is that the associated NFP, whether it be a university or a religious
organization, monitors its associated hospital's operations. For example,
representat'ives from the broader university community will sit on the
board of NFP hospitals which are part of the university, even though
these hospitals are separate NFPs. 15 9 These board representatives are
dependent on the associated university for their livelihood, and are in-
evitably people whom the university trusts to represent its interests. It is
highly unlikely in these circumstances that a board will decide to con-
vert in an effort to procure for themselves either personal benefits or
positions irt a new foundation.
Further, prohibiting converting NFB board members from sitting on
the board of the newly created entity creates a significant management
burden. The university situation is once again illustrative. A university
may have gi vice-president for financial affairs as a board member of its
NFP hospital. If this hospital converts, the cy pres hearing may deter-
mine that this money should go back to the university. 160 Consequently,
the university faces a dilemma. If the money returns to the university the
vice-president can no longer sit on the university board, because he or
she would violate the provisions of the conversion statute. In addition, if
the money transfers to a new foundation associated with the university,
the university will no longer be able to put one of their most experienced
people on ithe board of the new foundation if this clause were enacted.
The provision places a significant burden on the broader NFP while ad-
dressing a problem which is virtually eliminated in.the situation where
Seventh-Day Adventist hospitals operating in the U.S. are organized under the
church's group tax exemption. See id.
159. Hospitals are organized as separate NFPs from universities and
churches to protect the mother entities from the potential financial liabilities asso-
ciated with their operation. See generally EDWARD MCGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR. &
PHILIP C. SCRENSON, ASCENDING LIABILITY IN RELIGIOUS AND OTHER NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS (1984).
160. See, e.g., WORKING POLICY, supra note 158, at 91. Seventh-Day Ad-
ventist hospitals are organized under the provision that "in the case of dissolution,
the net owned assets of the organization shall be transferred to an organization
holding Seventh-Day Adventist denominational status which qualified under a tax-
exempt organization described in Section 501(c)(3)." Id. When there is a specific
reversion clause in the articles of incorporation of a converting entity, the cy pres
proceedings generally respect that clause. See Telephone Interview with Joanna
Sorris, Assistant Attorney General, The Commonwealth of Massachusetts Office of
the Attorney General (Apr. 24, 1998).
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the converting NFP is part of a broader NFP.
The Maryland bill's requirement that sixty percent of conversion
revenue go to a foundation with no connection at all to the converting
NFP or its "mother" NFP takes the concept of separating the converting
entity from the resulting foundation to an extreme. 16' The state has every
right to require that the use of revenue from conversions should be in
accordance with the NFP guidelines. However, it is a far stretch from
this position to mandating that control of these assets must transfer to a
state-appointed third party'62 completely disassociated from the organi-
zation which founded and operated the converting hospital. There is a
long history of state control over the use of conversion revenue, yet
there is no history of the state usurping private funds at the time of con-
version. Such legislation is perilously close to a governmental taking of
private assets.
163
In addition to concerns about governmental taking, there are solid
policy reasons to oppose such legislation. Community Catalyst does not
support this portion of the Maryland bill, 164 largely because it is con-
cerned that the state will simply use the revenue as a de facto supple-
ment to the state budget. 165 In addition, this effort to assert state control
over private assets provides a disincentive for private entities to invest
in risky ventures like hospitals. If the venture should fail, the state will
take sixty percent of any revenue recovered from the failed venture
161. See H.B. 167, 412th Sess. (Md. 1998) (enacted).
162. See, e.g., Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374,
395 (1995) (describing when an "independent" corporation can be considered a
government agency for purposes of determining an individual's Constitutional
rights). For the purpose of constitutional law, the Maryland foundation would
likely be considered a state actor as, like Amtrak, its board is under the direction
and control of the State, and it is organized for the purpose of pursuing State gov-
ernmental objectives. See id.
163. Clearly, if a university or religious body must "donate" 60% of con-
version revenue to the State, this places a severe restraint on alienation of property.
If the state can take control of revenue created by the sale of a hospital, can it also
take control of revenue from the sale of a synagogue, a school, a homeless shelter,
etc. from the NFP organization which ran the entity? If not, why not? Should the
rule be that if a NFP organization is a separate corporate entity, any sale of its as-
sets must revert to state control? But many NFPs set up their institutions as sepa-
rate NFPs to avoid ascending liability.




away from the private organization. NFPs would thus be more secure by
simply investing their reserves or involving themselves in less volatile
projects which may be of less value to society. Finally, Maryland's bill
places NFPs at a disadvantage to FP hospitals. While a FP hospital sys-
tem may buy and sell hospitals freely in an effort to maximize their re-
turn on investment, under Maryland's bill, NFP hospital systems may
not buy and sell hospitals in an effort to maximize their mission of pro-
viding health care to the disadvantaged. Thus, rather than preserving
community health care assets, this bill provides a disincentive for NFP
entities to enter the hospital business and disadvantages NFP hospital
systems presently operating vis-i-vis their FP competitors.
If those associated with a converting NFP may not sit on the board of
the foundation created to manage the conversion revenue, who should?
A logical answer is that the initial board of the foundation could be ap-
pointed by the converting NFP's board before their dissolution. To limit
cronyism, such appointments must be limited to individual applicants
from the relevant community who have no direct or familial association
with the converting NFP, its board members or any of its employees.
The Community Catalyst/Consumers Union Model Act also proposes
an annual report on foundation activities, including its grant making and
use of charitable assets.166 This type of report appears necessary to en-
sure both tlhe public and the state are aware of the use of the funds. In
addition to the Model Act mandate, a detailed report on the operating
expenses of these foundations, including the salaries of its executives is
necessary to ensure that resources are wasted in exorbitant overhead.
D. Stipulating the Use of Conversion Revenue
The final and most contentious area the three proposals cover is the
use of the conversion revenue. Surprisingly, the AHA guidelines appear
to be the most specific of the three proposals, suggesting the reservation
of conversion funds for health related purposes in the geographic vicin-
ity of the converting NFP hospital. 167 NAAG's resolution retains the cy
pres tradition, allowing use of the-funds for purposes set forth in the
NFP's artic:les or in the purpose of donors' grants.168 Finally, the Com-
166. See COMMUNITY CATALYST/CONSUMERS UNION, supra note 36, at
66.
167. See AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 34, at 11.
168. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note
35, § 5.01(4).
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munity Catalyst/Consumers Union Model Act requires the dedication of
the conversion revenue to serving the state's unmet health care needs.
169
There is a wide breadth of opinion on the issue of the precise use of
conversion revenue. Opinions range from the stringent views of the
California Attorney General, that use is exclusively for the acute health
care, 170 to the view that the funds should be for the needs of the commu-
nity of the converting health care entity. Grant Makers in Health advo-
cates this broad view.171 In between these views comes the belief that
funds should be for health care in general, but not necessarily acute
health care;172 the belief that funds should be for the benefit of the poor
in general since NFP hospitals were granted their tax free status based
on their provision of charity care; the belief that a particular mission for
the funds is their highest use; and the belief that all the conversion reve-
nue should revert to the government. Views on precisely how this
money should be used, in short, are as variable as the views of the
stakeholders in modern U.S. health care.
The first step in inquiring about the use of conversion revenue would
be to ask from whence it was created. NFP hospitals, just like any FP
entity, had an initial capitalization of the venture. That is to say, for
every NFP hospital in the United States, someone at some point funded
it. In many cases, the entities that did this were religious denomina-
tions/communities, thus the reason why Catholic, Baptist, Seventh-Day
Adventist and Jewish hospitals abound. In some cases, community
groups organized themselves to start a hospital to serve their populace.
In still other instances, specific organizations like the Shriners were the
driving force behind the creation of hospitals. In each and every case,
however, a group was established according to very specific goals re-
flecting the hospital's original charter. In addition to the founders, a
variety of restricted and unrestricted grants were received by each NFP
hospital. In a cy pres proceeding, the diverse goals of an institution and
its founders can be determined by determining the goals of the donor.
The suggestion to abandon this system, with its equitable recognition of
169. See COMMUNITY CATALYST/CONSUMERS UNION, supra note 36, at
63.
170. See Shack, supra note 127, at 1-2.
171. See Telephone Interview with Debra Brody, Director, Support Center
for New Health Foundations, Grantmakers in Health (Mar. 29, 1998).
172. See COMMUNITY CATALYST/CONSUMERS UNION, supra note 36, at 63
(noting that conversion revenue should be used only to meet the unmet health care
needs of the community).
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the goals of a hospital and its deference to the purpose of the converting
institution, is poorly conceived for two reasons. The first reason is that
any change would be inequitable. The second reason is that the argu-
ments to support such a change are inadequate. Finally, the logic behind
mandating the precise use of the funds addresses problems better suited
for governance reforms.
Any change to the cy pres procedure will result in an inequitable out-
come. Those who gave funds -toward the foundation and operation of
NFP hospitals likely did so with the assumption that the use of their do-
nations would be as they intended. If the funds could not be used as di-
rected, they would be put to use in a similar fashion. The capital contri-
butions to NFPs were not merely restricted to the goal of providing
community health care. The very purpose of cy pres is to recognize that
NFP hospitals and its donors are somewhat diverse.173 To statutorily
change the way in which these funds may be used after the dissolution
of the NFP hospital is to change the rules on the donors after they made
their contribution.
Arguments used to support statutorily limiting the use of conversion
revenue prove too much. It can be argued that conversion revenue
should be subject to statutory usage mandates because it was earned due
to a tax exemption based on the charitable purpose of providing com-
munity health care. This argument fails for two reasons: 1) tax exemp-
tions are granted for a wide range of charitable activities, and 2) the tax
free status was granted in exchange for a particular service provided.
While it is true that the basis of the grant of any NFP status is that it
perform charitable functions, it is also true that there are a wide variety
of charitable functions for which the state may grant NFP status. 74 Each
hospital's lax exempt status is predicated on its individual mission. For
example, many of the Seventh-Day Adventist hospitals were not granted
federal NFP status for their particular health care mission, but rather
held their NFP status as part of a group tax exemption held by the
church. 75 To claim that they were granted tax exemption on the basis
that they piovide acute health care is simply not accurate.
76
173. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
174. For example, education, religion or research.
175. See WORKING POLICY, supra note 158, at 90.
176. By staying true to cy pres principles, NFPs retain flexibility to use
revenue within the confines of a 501(c)(3) corporation. If the organizations like the
Catholic Church had decided not to build a hospital, but rather to invest their eccle-
siastical funds in the market, no one would suggest that they should turn over their
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A second rationale to justify the abandonment of cy pres for the impo-
sition of new restrictions on the use of conversion revenue is that the
state should statutorily mandate how these funds may be used as their
generation was due to the operator's tax free status. In other words, NFP
organizations that convert reap a windfall due to the equity built up in
NFP hospitals as a result of the favorable tax treatment they received
over the duration of the operation. This argument fails for two reasons.
First, the funds invested in NFP hospitals could have legally been in-
vested far more successfully in other ventures. Second, the granting of
NFP status to hospitals was always on a quidpro quo basis.
177
The organizations which founded many of the NFP hospitals in the
U.S. today could have invested the capital used to start the hospitals in
the market instead.1 78 Presumably, these churches, universities and civic
groups would have received a far better return on their investment if
they would have simply invested their capital in the market, rather than
investing it in a hospital. Yet, when NFP organizations receive a return
from investments income, there is no imposition of restrictions above
and beyond the NFP's charitable mission. It is thus incongruent to de-
mand such control on conversion revenue simply because the funds are
generated in the highly emotional area of health care.
In return for their tax free status, NFP hospitals provided a variety of
charitable services. It has been argued that the state is entitled control
over conversion revenue due to the value of the tax exemption the hos-
pital received. But this begs the question: Is the NFP hospital therefore
not entitled to the value of the charitable care it provided in exchange
for that tax exception at the time of conversion? A deal was struck be-
tween the state and the NFP entity.179 If the state believed 'at any time
capital gains to state control, or that their ability to use those capital gains for other
ventures that fall under their charitable charter. It is perverse to penalize these
organizations, therefore, for dedicating their resources to providing community
health care by denying them the same flexibility of the use of their funds that they
would have had if they had never ventured into the world of providing charitable
health care.
177. That is, a state bestows upon organizations not-for-profit status,
largely because of the charitable benefits those organizations provide to the general
public.
178. NFPs can, and do, invest reserve funds in the capital markets.
179. See The Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518,
643-44 (1819) (noting that a state enters a contract when it grants NFP status to an
organization).
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during the operation of the NFP that it was not receiving a fair return on
its tax exemption, it could have revoked the tax exception.'80 That it did
not is a tacit admission that the hospital provided adequate charitable
contributions to justify the tax exempt status. To claim that the NFP
hospital in effect owes the state something in return for the tax excep-
tion at the end of its operation ignores the benefit the state received
during the hospitals operation as a NFP. At the most, such a rationale
would require an accounting of the value of the benefit received by the
state against the value of the tax exemption. Such an accounting would
be impractical.'8 '
The final reason that the cy pres doctrine should not be abandoned in
favor of statutory mandates is that suggestions to do this focus on the
wrong issue. The vast majority of problems that have occurred with
conversions have been the result of governance issues such as circular
grant making, frivolous grants or questionable salaries to foundation
executives. Once the governance of the entities managing the conversion
revenue is addressed, these problems will be addressed. Abandoning cy
pres in favor of statutory stipulations on conversion revenue is inequita-
ble, has negative policy implications and will not address any significant
180. The state can, and does, revoke NFP status when it believes it is not
receiving back as much in charity than it forgoes in taxes. An example of this oc-
curred recently when the Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center lost its NFP status.
BNA's HEAI.TH CARE POLICY REPORT 591 (1998).
181. The first obstacle to such a process would be to determine what
"value" was to the state. Was the NFP valued merely for its provision of health
care to-the indigent, or was its teaching mission and/or religious mission included?
If not, why not? What if the foundation of a religious hospital assured the state that
it did not have to build a hospital itself? Would the NFP hospital be credited for
the accrued value of the investment saved by the state? The proportionate value of
the tax exenmption and the community service provided presumably changed over
time. As such, should the respective value be measured over the life of the NFP
and inflated into today's dollar values? Should each annual deficit or surplus be
calculated to include the time value of money if it would have been invested at the
time it was "'earned"? Even more troublesome than these complexities is the fact
that it is very hard to value charitable care provided in a hospital, let alone religious
and educational services provided. Should the health care provided to indigents be
valued at the: hospitals' rates at a given time, or should it be measured against the
Medicare reimbursement rate (if so, how should the value be measured prior to
Medicare)? Of course, the largest problem for such an undertaking is that the rec-
ords of the hospitals in question may reach back over a hundred years. It is some-
what doubtfid that the entire financial history will be able to be recreated to per-
form such a mammoth accounting process.
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concerns not already addressed by governance reforms. Thus the cy pres
doctrine should not be abandoned lightly.
IV. A MODEL STATUTE
The concepts in the previous discussion have been encapsulated in the
following model statute:
ALTERNATE MODEL STATUTE
(Provisions relate only to issues concerning the use of conversion reve-
nue)
SECTION 1. TRANSACTIONS COVERED
This statute covers all transactions which involve the transfer of
thirty-five percent or more of a not-for-profit health care entity's
assets or control. The transfer may occur in one or more trans-
actions over a period of up to five years.
Section 1 - Comments: The coverage of this statute is limited to a trans-
fer of thirty-five percent of assets or control so as not to unnecessarily
tie the hands of not-for-profit entities as they attempt to structure their
organizations as ongoing not-for-profit entities in a changing market-
place.
SECTION 2. FAIR VALUE
Any transfer of a not-for-profit health care entity's assets or
control or any management contract between a not-for-profit and
a for-profit entity must be for a fair value. To ensure fair value,
the following methodology must be followed:
(A) A party with appropriate expertise must be em-
ployed to determine the fair market value for the asset,
control or management contract in question. This party
may have no conflict of interest with either the not-for-
profit or the for-profit involved in the proposed trans-
action. Any sale of assets, transfer of control or man-
agement contract must be put up for competitive bid as
follows:
(1) Notice of interest to sell assets must be
made public through the appropriate trade
press.
(2) The period to receive bids must not be less
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than one month after the initial public no-
tice.
(3) If less than three bids are received, the
not-for-profit entity must solicit bids from
parties who would likely be interested.
(4) A report must be filed with the Attorney
General which provides the details of each
bid and the rationale for accepting the bid
approved.
(B) No employee of the not-for-profit, including board
members, may in anyway benefit financially from the
transaction. This includes benefiting through equity
stakes in the new for-profit entity, management con-
tracts with the new for-profit entity, placement on the
board of any entity which benefits from conversion
revenue or in any other way, except for employment at
market rates in the converted entity.
(C) Any party in management or on the board of the
not-for-profit entity with a conflict of interest in the
trnsaction must make public this conflict of interest
and take no part in the transaction.
Section 2 - Comments: This provision is designed to enforce a minimum
standard of due diligence in negotiating major transactions affecting the
ownership and control of not-for-profits. While it may appear somewhat
bureaucratic, it-merely requires what standard business practices would
demand with or without statutory language.
SECTION 3. USES OF CONVERSION REVENUE
The appropriate use of conversion revenue will be determined by
the application of the cy pres doctrine, with the following re-
strictions:
(A) No moneys may be used in any way for political
activities.
(B) No moneys may be used to benefit the new for-
profit entity.
(C) No moneys may be used for general charitable
purposes unrelated to the specific goals and operations
of the converted not-for-profit.
Section 3 - Comments: The purpose of this section is to ensure flexibil-
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ity, while at the same time preserve community assets.
SECTION 4. GOVERNANCE
(A) The entity receiving conversion revenue must be a corpora-
tion within section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.
(B) If the converting not-for-profit is part of a broader not-for-
profit entity, such as a religious denomination or a university,
the entity receiving conversion revenue need not be fully inde-
pendent of the converting not-for-profit. In the event that the
converting not-for-profit is not part of a broader not-for-profit
entity, the entity receiving conversion revenue must be fully in-
dependent of both the not-for-profit and for-profit entities in-
volved in the conversion which generated the revenue. For the
purpose of this statute, independence shall mean:
(1) No employee or board member of the former not-
for-profit or its subsidiaries may be employed, sit
on the board or work as an independent contractor
on behalf of the entity receiving conversion reve-
nue.
(2) No employee or board member of the for-profit in-
volved in the conversion, or its subsidiaries, may be
employed, sit on the board or work as an independ-
ent contractor on behalf of the entity receiving con-
version revenue.
(C) If the converting not-for-profit is part of a broader not-for-
profit entity, such as a religious denomination or a university,
the entity receiving conversion must report on the use of conver-
sion revenue as required by their charitable status. If the con-
verting not-for-profit is not part of a broader not-for-profit en-
tity, the entity receiving conversion revenue must make a public
report on how revenues were used on an annual basis, including:
(1) Detailed reporting of who grants were made to, the
dollar value of these grants, and the purpose of the
grants.
(2) The salaries and benefits of those working for the
entity broken down by individual.
(3) A detailed report of all other expenses and over-
head associated with the entity.
Section 4 - Comments: In many ways, governance is the largest issue in
the use of conversion revenue. Many of the problems of the past are due
to poor governance. For example, circular grant making can be tied to
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board composition. Many of these problems will not be present in a not-
for-profit that is part of a broader not-for-profit, as the broader organi-
zation will[ exercise control over any conversion activities, and prevent
the types of abuse possible in stand alone deals.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we are at a unique juncture in the history of the provi-
sion of health care in the United States. Conversions provide an oppor-
tunity to bolster charitable activities at a time in which government ac-
tivism is on the wane. Therefore, what occurs to the charitable assets of
NFP'hospitals which convert to FP status is of the utmost societal con-
cern. In the past, there have been abuses of conversion revenue. While
there has been much legislation on a state by state basis, the majority of
this legislation does not plug all the holes that allowed these problems in
the first place. Some of the legislation may actually result in inhibiting
the effective regulation of these transactions. For legislation to be effec-
tive, it is necessary to consider all the factors contained in the present
legislation;, and to balance these factors against the societal goals that
originally resulted in the tax exempt status being conferred on the con-
verting institutions. The inclusion of the Model Statute is to encourage
future careffully drafted, comprehensive legislation that will ensure con-
version revenues are put to appropriate use. The design of the Statue is
to resist the temptation to over-regulate NFPs, thereby inhibiting their
ability to survive in a changing market place. It also is to resist the
temptation to dispossess the NFP entities which founded many of the
nation's NFP from the use of conversion revenue in the event they
choose to convert a hospital.
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